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ABSTRACT 
Enterprise systems, real time recording and real time reporting pose new and 
significant challenges to the accounting and auditing professions. This includes 
developing methods and tools for continuous assurance and fraud detection. In 
this paper we propose a methodology for continuous fraud detection that exploits 
security audit logs, changes in master records and accounting audit trails in 
enterprise systems. The steps in this process are: (1) threat monitoring-
surveillance of security audit logs for ‘red flags’, (2) automated extraction and 
analysis of data from audit trails, and (3) using forensic investigation techniques 
to determine whether a fraud has actually occurred. We demonstrate how mySAP, 
an enterprise system, can be used for audit trail analysis in detecting financial 
frauds; afterwards we use a case study of a suspected fraud to illustrate how to 
implement the methodology. 
Keywords: Continuous assurance, continuous audit, fraud detection, enterprise 
system, accounting information systems, mySAP, audit trails. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fraud continues to be of major concern to business companies, not-for-profit 
organizations and governmental agencies. Recent surveys by leading accounting 
firms document that fraud is costing these organizations billions of dollars per 
year (BDO 2008; KPMG 2008; Standards Australia 2008). Furthermore, fraud 
means reduced macroeconomic output. Estimates indicate that fraud costs the 
Australian economy up to 3 billion dollars each year (Standards Australia 2008).  
The incidence and financial impact of fraud seems to be steadily increasing and 
many organizations are ill-prepared to prevent and detect fraud (KPMG 2008). 
Australian Standard AS 8001-2008 (Standards Australia 2008) proposes that 
organizations implement a fraud detection program to quickly identify instances 
of fraud should preventive measures and internal controls fail. It recommends the 
development of systems for targeted post-transactional review and strategic use of 
computer systems including effective data mining and real-time transaction 
assessment to identify suspect fraudulent transactions. In a similar vein, PCAOB 
Auditing Standard No. 5 stresses the responsibility of external auditors to conduct 
a fraud risk assessment in planning and performing the audit of internal control 
over financial reporting, and to consider deficiencies in controls to prevent and 
detect fraud when assessing the risk of material misstatement in the financial 
statements (PCAOB 2007).  
Few information technology innovations have had as much impact on business 
organizations in recent years as enterprise systems (sometimes known as 
enterprise resource planning systems or ERP) (Rikhardsson & Kraemmergaard 
2006). Enterprise systems are off-the-shelf applications that offer a 
comprehensive set of functionalities supporting and integrating most business 
processes, including accounting, sales, purchasing and production in a single 
system architecture. An enterprise system has several distinctive characteristics 
(Norris et al. 1998): 
• Multi-functional in scope – it tracks financial results (dollars), 
procurement (material), sales (people and goods) and manufacturing 
(people and resources); 
• Integrated in nature, that is, when a piece of data is entered regarding one 
of the functions, data relevant to other functions is changed; 
• Modular in structure, that is, it can be used in a way that is as expansive 
or narrow as an organization chooses. 
Modern enterprise systems are web enabled, which can mean browser based user 
interfaces, standardised data exchange and web-based reporting. It has been 
estimated that organizations worldwide spend approximately $18.3 billion US 
every year on enterprise systems (Shanks et al. 2003). These systems have 
significant implications for accounting and auditing in general and fraud control 
in particular (ITGI 2006; Bae & Ashcroft 2004, Chapman & Chua 2003; 
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Chapman 2005). However, enterprise systems are not typically utilised for fraud 
detection, certainly not in a systematic manner. These systems increase the 
complexity of the accounting and auditing environment but also offer new 
opportunities for improvements in effectiveness and efficiency of these processes 
(Spathis 2006). 
Enterprise systems offer functionalities for continuous monitoring of controls and 
detecting fraudulent transactions. One such functionality is audit trails. This paper 
illustrates how audit trails in enterprise systems can be used for continuous fraud 
detection. It discusses continuous assurance and fraud detection and links these 
processes to enterprise systems. It explains the concept of audit trails and how 
they can be used for fraud detection within the context of a specific enterprise 
system solution – i.e. mySAP, which is described below, is a product of the 
German company SAP.  It then proposes a methodology for continuous fraud 
detection that utilises various audit trails available in enterprise systems, namely 
security audit logs, changes in master records and accounting audit trails. This 
methodology is comprised of two stages: (1) threat monitoring, involving high-
level surveillance of security audit logs for ‘red flags’, and (2) automated 
extraction and analysis of data from audit trails to document user actions. At that 
point, forensic investigation is used to determine whether a financial fraud has 
been committed. 
2. DEDUCTIVE FRAUD AUDITING  
The essential steps in detecting fraudulent transactions are (Albrecht et al. 2009; 
Institute of Internal Auditors 2003): 
1. Understanding the business or operations. 
2. Performing a risk analysis to identify the types of frauds that can 
occur. 
3. Deducing the symptoms that likely frauds would generate. 
4. Using computer software to search for these symptoms. 
5. Investigating suspect transactions. 
Each organization must incorporate within its risk management processes 
consideration of fraud risks. Common fraud schemes, preventive measures and 
symptoms (‘red flags’) are well-documented (see Albrecht et al. 2009; Baker 
1999; Bologna & Lindquist 1995; Institute of Internal Auditors 2003; Koletar 
2003; Zack 2003). For example, vendor frauds may involve creation of a fake 
vendor, purchase order, goods movement and invoice, or just a subset of these 
transactions. The enterprise system may pay the invoice automatically once these 
steps have been completed with Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT). EFT allows the 
transfer of money to the perpetrator’s bank account without having to establish a 
bank account in the name of the vendor. 
The perpetrator may change the banking details for a vendor with whom the 
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organization transacts frequently. These details specify the bank number and the 
account number to be paid through bank transfer. The perpetrator switches these 
details to their own bank account or that of an accomplice. An invoice (often a 
duplicate) is entered for payment, and is subsequently paid automatically by the 
system (possibly without the involvement of the perpetrator). The banking details 
are then switched back to their original form. This is referred to as ‘flipping bank 
details’. The respective vendor does not receive the duplicate payment and is 
therefore not aware of the fraud. Auditors may sample the invoice and payment, 
but will find them apparently genuine. Tests for duplicate invoices and payments 
may detect this fraud. However, many organizations have large numbers of 
duplicate payments, e.g. lease payments on photocopiers, and investigation of 
each transaction may not be feasible. This scheme is more difficult to detect if the 
invoice details are similar, but not identical.  
Segregating vendor maintenance, invoice entry and payment can significantly 
reduce the risk of such frauds in the absence of collusion among personnel 
(Srinidhi 1994; Little and Best 2003). Weaknesses in segregation controls are 
common and often provide opportunities for such fraud schemes (KPMG 2008).  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 has brought fraud and fraud detection to 
the fore with its emphasis on improving internal controls to reduce the risk of 
financial fraud. One of the important issues addressed in SOX is timely fraud 
detection and the link between fraud detection, internal controls and information 
systems (ITGI 2006). The premise is that early detection of fraud limits losses, 
prevents further fraud and improves controls. The real time nature of transaction 
data in enterprise systems and integrated accounting systems presents a specific 
challenge in that regard.  
The next section looks at the area of continuous assurance in the context of 
enterprise systems.  
3. CONTINUOUS ASSURANCE 
Assurance services have been broadly defined as independent professional 
services that improve the quality of information for decision makers. In the 
literature, continuous assurance also appears to be a broad term for services that 
aim to provide continuous assurance to the buyer of these services or to a third 
party (Best et al. 2004; Alles et al. 2002; Elliot 2002; Rezaee et al. 2002; Sutton 
2006; Jones & Xiao 2003; Yu et al. 2000; Murthy & Groomer 2004; Searcy & 
Woodroof 2003; Nelson 2004). The term continuous assurance is a more far-
reaching term than continuous auditing as the latter service focuses on assurances 
only related to the annual financial report (Alles et al. 2002). Continuous 
assurance usually focuses on the quality of information used in internal decision 
making, publicly disclosed information and measures and controls for 
safeguarding assets (Elliot 2002; Alles et al. 2002).  
To implement this process in an enterprise system environment, two main 
approaches have been proposed. These are the Embedded Audit Module (EAM) 
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approach and the Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) approach.  
The EAM approach, its benefits, drawbacks, technologies and processes have 
been discussed for many years (Groomer & Murthy 1989; Groomer & Murthy 
2003; Alles et al. 2004; Murthy & Groomer 2004, Debreceny et al. 2005; Alles et 
al. 2006). EAMs are basically independent software modules embedded in an 
information system where they monitor transactions and activities.  Research 
indicates that this approach runs into practical difficulties (Debreceny et al 2005; 
Kuhn & Sutton 2006). For example, concerns include having a “foreign” code in 
its enterprise system that is controlled by a third party – i.e. the external auditors. 
The maintenance of an EAM can be difficult given the changes, updates and 
modifications that routinely take place in enterprise systems. There are also legal 
liability issues should the EAM damage the host system in some way – a liability 
that an external auditor may be keen to avoid.  Consequently, the use of EAM is 
limited (Debreceny et al. 2005; Alles et al. 2006).  
As an alternative to EAM, the use of a MCL has been suggested. This approach 
also has a rather long history in the context of information systems dating as far 
back as 1991 (Vasarhelyi & Halper 1991; Vasarhelyi et al. 2004; Kuhn & Sutton 
2005; Alles et al. 2006; Kuhn & Sutton 2006; Du & Roohani 2007; Li et al. 
2007). The MCL differs from the EAM in that it is an independent non-integrated 
software solution that uses middleware to extract data from the enterprise system 
which is to be monitored. This data can then be compared to a predefined set of 
rules or analysed. Currently, this approach seems more viable than the EAM 
approach as it does not have the same concerns regarding software maintenance, 
legal liability and client independence (Kuhn and Sutton 2006). Moreover, this 
approach is the one followed by many of the software vendors currently offering 
software solutions for continuous monitoring. It is also the approach explored in 
the section on automated continuous fraud detection later in this paper. 
The monitoring activities conducted in both the EAM and the MCL approaches 
can focus on transaction data, which is monitored for violations of preset 
standards or unusual patterns. Examples could be postings on certain accounts 
exceeding some maximum posting limits or transaction flows exhibiting some 
unusual characteristics over a certain period of time. The monitoring activities 
may also focus on user behaviour. In most enterprise systems, users’ activities are 
logged. Changes in configuration, security and master records, and financial 
transactions are tagged with date/timestamps, user identification, and workstation 
identification which are collected in various audit trails. As will be discussed later, 
these audit trails are of different types but usually an integrated part of the system. 
Some audit trails must be activated before they become functional; others are a 
standard part of the system and are automatically present. These audit trails can 
then be extracted from the system and analysed for atypical user activity, 
authorization breaches, and profiling the activities of particular users.  
In the following sections, we will discuss audit trails in enterprise systems, their 
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form in mySAP, and the detection of a vendor fraud using audit trail analysis.  
4. AUDIT TRAILS AND ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS 
Audit trails are records of user activity. They may be maintained by the operating 
system and by application software such as enterprise systems. Operating system 
audit trails record user actions, including successful and failed logins and 
programs executed, as well as resources consumed. Enterprise systems typically 
incorporate authentication processes and user roles/profiles that restrict access to 
the application and limit a user’s capabilities to those associated with his/her job 
function. Potential fraud threats and related principles of segregation of duties 
should guide the design of user roles/profiles. Audit trails maintained by 
enterprise systems may include security audit logs, records of changes in master 
records and details of accounting transactions. 
It is important to point out that these audit trails do not necessarily involve EAM 
nor MCL. These audit trails are part of enterprise systems and often have their 
own reporting facilities. However, in the context of continuous auditing they can 
be used for monitoring user activity. As such they can be a part of either EAM or 
MCL approaches.  
Enterprise system security audit logs typically record details of each user action.  
These logs often include successful logins, failed logins, starting a transaction 
(e.g. entry of an invoice), failed attempts to start transactions (i.e. prevented by the 
user’s role/profile), automatic locking of a user’s account because of multiple 
failed logins, creation of new roles/profiles and changes in user master records. 
Configuration of the security audit log defines what events are recorded. For 
example, only failed activity may be recorded. These audit trails may be retained 
for periodic review, then archived and/or deleted.  
Master records, such as those for vendors, are an important ingredient in many 
fraud schemes. In order for the system to distribute funds through a cheque or 
EFT payment, a master record must be created or modified (e.g. temporarily 
changing a vendor’s banking details). Records of such changes in master records 
show user identification, type of change (e.g. create, delete, change), and contents 
of fields created/deleted/changed. Accounting audit trails are sets of records that 
permit tracing accounting transactions from their source to the updating of 
accounting balances, or tracing any account balance back (‘drilling-down’) to the 
relevant source transactions. They provide the organization with the ability to 
maintain sufficiently detailed records to answer enquiries from customers or 
vendors, to produce detailed reports and monthly statements for customers, and to 
provide data for managerial decision-making. Master record changes and 
accounting audit trails are retained on-line usually for the entire fiscal year, and 
archived for several years to satisfy the requirements of taxation and company 
legislation.  
The audit trails of enterprise systems can serve several purposes: 
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1. Review of access: Audit trails allow examination of the history of access 
by individual users or groups of users, showing actions performed or 
attempted. Audit trails also can report which users have performed 
specific functions, such as changes to vendor master records or the entry 
of vendor invoices. Analysis of audit trails may also reveal limitations in 
the organization’s security model and its implementation. 
2. Review of changes in security: Changes made to the security of the 
system can be reviewed periodically by an independent person for 
authorisation and integrity. 
3. Review of attempts to by-pass security:  Audit trails may be reviewed for 
attempts and repeated attempts by users and intruders to perform 
unauthorised functions. 
4. Deterrent against attempts to by-pass security:  Users should be aware of 
the existence of audit trails and their routine review as a deterrent against 
attempts to by-pass security. 
5. Fraud detection: Audit trails can be used to detect potential fraud by 
searching for red flags. Fraudulent activity may be perpetrated by real 
users acting in their own name, by users acting in collusion with other 
users, by real users masquerading as other users, or by intruders 
masquerading as authorised users. In each case, the actions of these 
‘users’ are recorded in audit trails and these can be scrutinised for 
activities that are recognised as red flags for particular types of fraud. 
The next section examines how these types of audit trails are implemented in 
mySAP.  
5. MYSAP AND SYSTEM SECURITY 
The mySAP solution combines complete and scalable software for enterprise 
resource planning with a flexible, open technology platform (the SAP 
NetWeaver) that can leverage and integrate SAP and non-SAP systems. It builds 
on and extends functionalities in earlier SAP solutions (SAP R/2 and SAP R/3), 
which have been on the market since the 1970s. SAP offers integrated modules 
for accounting, production planning, materials management, sales and 
distribution, quality management, project management and more. mySAP allows 
complex enabling companies to integrate most financial, people, asset and data 
management tasks in one comprehensive IT infrastructure. The mySAP 
framework includes four individual solutions: (1) mySAP Financials, (2) mySAP 
Human Capital Management, (3) mySAP Operations and (4) mySAP Corporate 
Services.  
The system provides functionality supporting internal control assessment, such as 
reporting on changes in user profiles and segregation of duties. End-users and 
‘system’ users access the system through the same authentication process 
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requiring the entry of a client identification, user name, password and language. 
These users share the same main menu to access accounting, logistics 
(procurement, sales, production) and human resource transactions, as well as the 
mySAP program development, security administration and configuration 
functions. Accordingly, access controls must be implemented to restrict the 
actions of all users in conformance with their assigned roles. 
Access and user controls are implemented in mySAP using roles, profiles and 
authorizations which are assigned to users. The individual functions (menu 
options) are identified within the system using transaction codes. For example, the 
function to change vendor master records has the transaction code FK02. Entry of 
a vendor invoice is FB60. Associated with each transaction code is a set of 
authorizations which must be assigned to a given user to allow them to perform 
that function. User profiles consisting of sets of authorizations and other profiles 
should be designed according to principles of segregation of incompatible 
transaction codes in order to reduce opportunities for fraud (Little & Best 2003). 
Any user who has the authority to change a vendor’s banking details and enter a 
vendor invoice has the opportunity to commit fraud.  
Security administrators use mySAP’s profile generator software to design generic 
roles which may be assigned to individuals. To illustrate, a role may be designed 
for vendor maintenance officers, consisting of just the transaction codes required 
for that role and considering relevant segregation of duties principles. Such a role 
should not include the transaction code FB60 Enter Vendor Invoice. Profile 
generator automates the process of building profiles with the required 
authorizations for roles. Given the large number of transaction codes in the 
system (at least 125,000) and some uncertainty regarding appropriate segregation 
principles, some users may be assigned authorizations which permit certain fraud 
schemes. Accordingly, there is a need for auditing of access controls and 
automated approaches for fraud detection which analyse audit trails. 
Auditors typically plan to evaluate and test the client’s security model for 
compliance. This model consists of a set of roles (or profiles) and their 
assignment to users. The transactions (and authorizations) assigned to each role 
are also documented. The security model is ‘desk-checked’ for completeness and 
proper segregation of duties, and then tested for proper implementation on a 
‘sample’ basis by interrogating authorizations, profiles, roles and user master 
records. Proper segregation of organizational responsibilities is a critical concern 
in this process. 
Authorizations may also be audited by interrogating system security tables to 
identify authorizations assigned to users and the corresponding transaction codes 
which may be executed. This may be accomplished using software developed in-
house or acquired from third-party providers, or using standard mySAP reports.  
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6. DETECTING VENDOR FRAUD WITH AUDIT TRAIL 
ANALYSIS IN MYSAP  
mySAP offers managers and auditors increased facilities for monitoring user 
activities in the system, including potential fraudulent activities. These activities 
are collected automatically in mySAP’s audit trails. Below we describe these 
facilities and illustrate how a vendor fraud based on changes in vendor banking 
details and duplicate invoice entry may be detected through audit trail analysis.  
The security audit log facility provides a high-level overview of user activity at 
the transaction code level. A profile is created and filters are defined specifying 
which events are recorded in the log (transaction SM19). Selected events are 
stored in a daily audit file on each application server. These audit files are retained 
until deleted.  
Filters specify which clients and users are to be monitored. Events may be 
selected for logging according to audit class, such as logons, transaction starts, 
and user master changes, or according to event class - critical events, critical 
events combined with important events, or all events. Alternatively, a set of 
individually selected events may be selected as a detailed audit configuration. 
Once the filter(s) and profile are activated, the application server must be restarted 
and then logging commences. 
Table 1 illustrates the relationship between audit classes, event classes and the 
message text for individual events. 
Audit records contain the following fields for each logged event: Date, Time, 
Client, User-id, Transaction Code, Terminal Name (computer name from 
Windows), Message Identifier, and Message Text. A reporting facility is provided 
for the security audit log. Reports may be produced for specified date ranges, 
users, transaction codes, audit classes, event classes and messages. 
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Audit Class Event 
Class 
Message Text 
Dialog Logon Non-Critical User Logoff 
 Important Logon Successful (Type = $A) 
 Important Logon Failed (Reason = $B, Type = $A) 
 Critical Logon Failed (Reason = $B, Type = $A) 
 Critical User &B Locked in Client $A after Erroneous Password 
Attempts 
 Critical User &B in Client &A Unlocked After Being Locked Due 
to Invalid Password Entered 
Transaction Start Non-Critical Transaction &A Started 
 Critical Start Transaction &A Failed 
User Master Change Non-Critical Password changed for user &B in client &A 
 Important User &A Deleted 
 Important User &A Locked 
 Important User &A Unlocked 
 Important Authorizations for User &A Changed 
 Important User Master Record &A Changed 
 Important Authorization/Authorization Profile &B Created 
 Important Authorization/Authorization Profile &B Deleted 
 Important Authorization/Authorization Profile &B Changed 
 Critical User &A Created 
 Critical Authorization/Authorization Profile &B Activated 
Other Events Important Download &A Bytes to File &C 
 Important Digital Signature (Reason = &A, ID = &B) 
 Critical Digital Signature Error (Reason = &A, ID = &B) 
 Critical Password check failed for user &B in client &A 
System Critical Audit Configuration Changed 
 Critical Application Server Stopped 
 Critical  Application Server Started 
 Critical  Audit Slot &A Inactive 
 Critical Audit Active Status Set to &1 
 
Table 1: Security Audit Log – Examples of events that can be logged 
These functionalities can be used to detect fraudulent user behaviour. Figure 1 
presents an excerpt from the security audit log showing a range of logged events. 
Of particular note are the following: 
• User HACKERW uses workstation 1 in room S826 (see column 6 – 
Terminal). 
• On 01.04.2008, HACKERW attempted to run transaction F110 
(column 5 – Transaction Code) Vendor Payments unsuccessfully. 
Message-id AU4 signifies a failed action. 
• HACKERW performed changes to vendor master records using 
transaction FK02 on 03.04.2008 and 05.04.2008. 
• User SMITHY apparently had 3 failed logons on 08.04.2008 from the 
same workstation as used by HACKERW. The user was automatically 
locked and had to be unlocked by a security administrator 
ZADMIN01. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 4(1) 
 
49 
 
• On 24.04.2008, ZADMIN01 used transaction SU01 to create user 
ZMYUSER. Authorizations were assigned to this user. 
• On the same day at 11:31:25, ZADMIN01 used transaction PFCG 
Profile Generator to create a new role Z:VENDM50 (which is assigned 
a series of transaction codes). 
• Transaction SUPC (Generate Profiles) was then used to generate the 
authorizations and profile for the new role. 
• ZADMIN01 then proceeded to assign the new role to user ZMYUSER. 
• User ZMYUSER then apparently logged on to client 600 and was 
required to change the initial password. 
• ZMYUSER used transaction FK02 to perform vendor maintenance and 
then logged off. 
• User ZADMIN01 used transaction SU01 to delete user ZMYUSER 
(This can be done even after this user has performed activity in the 
system). 
Changes in master records are stored in two tables – CDHDR Change Document 
Headers and CDPOS Change Document Items. Changes include creation and 
deletion of master records and changes in fields. Each change document header 
record in table CDHDR specifies: Client, Object class of the master record, e.g. 
category of vendor, customer, general ledger account, cost centre, etc., Object 
value, i.e. vendor number, cost centre code, Change document number, User 
name who made the change, Date, Time, and Transaction code, e.g. FK02 
Change Vendor Master Record. 
For each change document number, there are corresponding change document 
items in the CDPOS table. Change document items have the following fields: 
Client, Object class of the master record, e.g. category of vendor, customer, 
general ledger account, cost centre, etc., Object value, i.e. vendor number, cost 
centre code, Change document number, Table name, e.g. LFBK – Vendor Master 
(Bank Details), Table record key, Field name, Change type -  U(pdate), I(nsert). E 
(delete single field), D(elete). 
Figure 2 illustrates how changes in banking details for vendor 100163 would 
appear in these tables. The original bank recording number and account number is 
123-456 1234567. This vendor was created by user SMITHY on 15.02.2008 
using transaction code FK01 (See first row in Table CDHDR and first row in 
Table CDPOS). On 03.04.2008, these details were changed by user HACKERW 
to 123-456 7777777 (see second row in Table CDHDR and second row in Table 
CDPOS), and then restored to the original values on 05.04.2008 (see the third row 
in each of the Tables). 
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Date Time Client User Trans 
Code
Terminal Message 
Id. 
Message Text 
01.04.2008 08:55:04 600 HACKERW  S826-01 AU2 Logon Failed (Reason = 1, Type = A) 
01.04.2008 08:56:30 600 HACKERW  S826-01 AU1 Logon Successful (Type=A) 
        
01.04.2008 11:25:09 600 HACKERW  S826-01 BU2 Password changed for user HACKERW 
        
01.04.2008 12:31:54 600 HACKERW FK01 S826-01 AU3 Transaction FK01 Started 
01.04.2008 13:43:11 600 HACKERW F110 S826-01 AU4 Start Transaction F110 Failed 
        
01.04.2008 18:18:12 600 HACKERW  S826-01 AUC User Logoff 
        
03.04.2008 08:37:40 600 HACKERW   AU1 Logon Successful (Type=A) 
        
03.04.2008 10:20:25 600 HACKERW FK02 S826-01 AU3 Transaction FK02 Started 
03.04.2008 10:23:44 600 HACKERW FB60 S826-01 AU3 Transaction FB60 Started 
        
05.04.2008 17:14:31 600 HACKERW FK02 S826-01 AU3 Transaction FK02 Started 
        
08.04.2008 08:55:04 600 SMITHY  S826-01 AU2 Logon Failed (Reason = 1, Type = A) 
08.04.2008 08:55:06 600 SMITHY  S826-01 AU2 Logon Failed (Reason = 1, Type = A) 
08.04.2008 08:55:08 600 SMITHY  S826-01 AU2 Logon Failed (Reason = 1, Type = A) 
08.04.2008 08:55:09 600 SMITHY   AUM User SMITHY Locked in Client 600 After Erroneous Password 
Checks 
08.04.2008 09:05:01 600 ZADMIN01 SU01 B315-01 AU3 Transaction SU01 Started 
08.04.2008 09:05:02 600 ZADMIN01  B315-01 AUN User SMITHY in Client 600 Unlocked After Being Locked Due 
to Inval. Password Entered 
        
24.04.2008 11:15:33 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AU1 Logon Successful (Type=A) 
24.04.2008 11:16:16 600 ZADMIN01   SU01  B315-01   AU3 Transaction SU01 Started 
24.04.2008 11:18:38 600 ZADMIN01   SU01  B315-01   AU7 User ZMYUSER Created 
24.04.2008 11:18:39 600 ZADMIN01   SU01  B315-01   AUB Authorizations for User ZMYUSER Changed 
24.04.2008 11:28:34 600 ZADMIN01   SU03  B315-01   AU3 Transaction SU03 Started 
24.04.2008 11:31:09 600 ZADMIN01   SU03  B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:AUTH5001/F_KNA1_BUK Activated 
24.04.2008 11:31:25 600 ZADMIN01   PFCG B315-01   AU3 Transaction PFCG Started 
24.04.2008 11:33:05 600 ZADMIN01   SUPC B315-01   AU3 Transaction SUPC Started 
24.04.2008 11:36:23 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_BKPF_BEK Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_BKPF_BLA Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_BKPF_BUK Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_BKPF_GSB Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_BKPF_KOA Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_LFA1_AEN Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_LFA1_APP Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_LFA1_BEK Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_LFA1_BUK Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_LFA1_GEN Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/ F_LFA1_GRP Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Authorization Z:VENDM50_00/  
S_TCODE Activated 
24.04.2008 11:36:24 600 ZADMIN01               B315-01   AUU Profile Z:VENDM50_ Activated 
24.04.2008 11:37:15 600 ZADMIN01   SU01  B315-01   AU3 Transaction SU01 Started 
24.04.2008 11:37:47 600 ZADMIN01   SU01  B315-01   AUD User Master Record ZMYUSER Changed 
24.04.2008 11:37:48 600 ZADMIN01   SU01  B315-01   AUB Authorizations for User ZMYUSER Changed 
        
24.04.2008 11:38:10 600 ZMYUSER                B315-01   AU1 Logon Successful (Type=A) 
24.04.2008 11:38:18 600 ZMYUSER     B315-01   BU2 Password changed for user ZMYUSER in client 600 
24.04.2008 11:39:00 600 ZMYUSER    FK02   B315-01   AU3 Transaction FK02 Started 
24.04.2008 11:40:07 600 ZMYUSER                B315-01   AUC User Logoff 
        
24.04.2008 11:56:16 600 ZADMIN01   SU01  B315-01   AU3 Transaction SU01 Started 
24.04.2008 11:58:38 600 ZADMIN01   SU01  B315-01   AU8 User ZMYUSER Deleted 
        
24.04.2008 18:18:12 600 ZADMIN01  B315-01 AUC User Logoff 
 
Figure 1 - mySAP Security Audit Log 
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Figure 2 - Changes in Vendors Banking Details in mySAP 
 
Figure 3 provides an overview of tables storing mySAP financial accounting audit 
trails. In following the audit trail from Figure 2 to Figure 3, it can be seen that 
HACKERW used transaction code FB60 (see table BKPF) to enter a vendor 
invoice on 03.04.2008. This transaction was recorded as document number 
1000000201 in table BKPF Accounting Document Headers. The user name, date 
and transaction code are stored in this record. There are three debit/credit entries 
corresponding to this document in table BSEG Accounting Document Line Items. 
Every posting to a general ledger reconciliation (control) account also specifies 
the relevant subsidiary ledger record. Since account number 209000 (Table 
SKAT) is the Accounts Payable account, the vendor number (100163) is also 
recorded in the line item record (Table LFA1). Tables BKPF and BSEG store the 
posting history for both general ledger accounts and subsidiary ledger records, 
thereby facilitating both integration of data and automatic reconciliation of 
subsidiary ledgers with reconciliation accounts. General ledger account texts 
(names) are stored in table SKAT. Vendor general data including vendor name, 
date created and creating user are stored in table LFA1. 
As can be seen in the above, the data describing the fraud is well-documented in 
the audit trails in the enterprise system. However, detecting user activities and 
analysing them for fraud potential is a laborious task if done manually. We 
propose a methodology based on automated continuous analysis of audit trails. 
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Figure 3 - mySAP Audit Trail 
 
7. AUTOMATED CONTINUOUS FRAUD DETECTION 
METHODOLOGY 
Using mySAP as an example, we propose an MCL-based methodology for fraud 
detection that utilises the security audit logs, changes in master records and 
accounting audit trails present in mySAP. This methodology is comprised of two 
stages: (1) threat monitoring, which involves high-level surveillance of security 
audit logs for ‘red flags’, and (2) automated extraction and analysis of data from 
audit trails to provide documentation of user actions. These two stages are 
demonstrated for the vendor fraud scenario. 
Stage 1 involves threat monitoring (routine scanning) of security audit logs. These 
logs should be extracted for regular review and retained to provide a permanent 
actual user profile for each user. The organization may develop a database 
application storing security audit logs for the past year, and user profiles (the set 
of transaction codes performed by each user during specific time periods, e.g. last 
week, last month). Queries should be available to list users who have performed 
specified transaction codes. Standard reports should be available to present any 
specified user’s profile and to highlight changes in users’ profiles over time. A 
knowledge base system may also be developed to generate forecasts of expected 
user activity. Changes in actual user behaviour may then be detected promptly 
and investigated (Best et al. 2004). 
To detect specific fraud threats, a standard report should present a list of users and 
log details where a critical combination of transaction codes has been performed 
by a user. For example, any user who has performed vendor master record 
changes (transaction code FK02) and vendor invoice entry (FB60) should be 
classified as suspicious, since the combination of these functions may signal the 
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flipping of bank details and vendor fraud as described in the diction on deductive 
fraud auditing. A table of suspects should be generated to facilitate detailed 
analyses of master record changes and accounting transactions. In Figure 1, 
HACKERW, who executed these transactions, would be identified as a potential 
suspect. Identification of the affected vendors requires data extraction from the 
appropriate audit trails. 
Stage 2 requires routine extraction of master record changes and accounting audit 
trails, as a foundation for further analysis of suspect behaviour for the set of 
chosen fraud schemes. The following data may be extracted from mySAP through 
the data dictionary or using remote function calls. 
1. Change document headers: Records are extracted from table 
CDHDR (see Figure 2) for changes involving vendor account 
groups, the current fiscal year and critical transaction codes (e.g. 
FK02). 
2. Change document items: Records are extracted from table CDPOS 
(see Figure 2) for INSERT (I) changes involving vendor account 
groups, table LFBK, and field KEY. 
3. Accounting document headers: Records are extracted from table 
BKPF (see Figure 3) for documents involving the target company 
code, current fiscal year, and transaction codes associated with fraud 
schemes (e.g. FB60 – vendor invoice entry, F110 – vendor payment). 
4. Accounting document line items: Records are extracted from table 
BSEG (see Figure 3) for postings (rows) involving the target 
company code, current fiscal year, and accounts payable general 
ledger accounts. 
Change document headers and change document items may be used to produce a 
detailed analysis of the banking details changes performed by the suspect users. In 
particular, the relevant vendor numbers are identified. For example, examining 
the data in Figure 2, it is evident that HACKERW has changed the banking details 
for vendor 100163, on 03.04.2008 and switched them back on 05.04.2008. The 
accounting document headers and line items may be used to present the 
accounting transactions entered by the suspects and invoice and payment 
transactions for the associated vendors. The invoice (FB60) posted by 
HACKERW on 03.04.2008 was for $77,000 (including sales tax) to vendor 
100163. Such an analysis may be correlated to test for specified sequences of 
events such as: changed vendor details, entered invoice, payment of invoice, 
changed vendor details. If payment occurs before 05.04.2008, it appears that 
HACKERW may have successfully perpetrated a vendor fraud since payment is 
made to the changed banking details before they are flipped back. A thorough 
investigation is still required to determine whether this is the case. 
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8. CASE STUDY RESULTS – A LARGE AUSTRALIAN 
COMPANY 
The application of this methodology assisted in a fraud investigation for a large 
Australian company with a very large mySAP system implementation.  
Basic application of threat monitoring of the security audit log revealed that a 
terminated system administration person (SADMIN01) had since logged in and 
changed a password and the profile of his spouse, also in system administration 
(SADMIN02). A high risk of unauthorised activity and/or fraud was identified, 
possibly involving SADMIN01, SADMIN02 or both users working in collusion. 
The findings from the application of this methodology are summarised below. 
More thorough threat monitoring was instituted covering a period of over four 
years. It seemed that both SADMIN01 and SADMIN02 had been engaged in 
vendor maintenance (FK02) and invoice entry (FB60) activity. However, other 
system administrators had also performed similar functions, in some cases to a 
much larger extent. Concern was raised that members of the SADMIN group 
could be working in collusion with SADMIN01 and/or SADMIN02. These users 
were also responsible for user security, including the creation and maintenance of 
user master records and profiles. There was also an increased risk of fake users in 
the system, engaged in fraudulent activities. 
SADMIN01, SADMIN02, SADMIN04, SADMIN06 and SADMIN11 had made 
changes to vendors (FK02) as follows: 
• SADMIN01 – 2 changes to only 2 vendors.  No flipping of bank details 
was feasible. 
• SADMIN02 – 689 changes, with more than 1 change to only 13 vendors. 
Flipping was feasible. No changes were made to vendors maintained by 
SADMIN01. 
• SADMIN04 – 7 changes with more than 1 change to only 2 vendors. 
Flipping was feasible. No changes were made to vendors maintained by 
SADMIN01. 
• SADMIN06 – 2585 changes with more than 1 change to more than 500 
vendors. No changes were made to vendors maintained by SADMIN01. 
• SADMIN11 – 4403 changes with more than 1 change to more than 400 
vendors. 1 change was made to a vendor maintained by ZADMIN01. 
The vendors maintained by SADMIN01 and SADMIN02 were targeted to 
investigate the presence of flipping activity. Numerous changes to banking details 
of vendors were performed by SADMIN11 on Christmas Eve in year 1, which 
were subsequently changed (back in some cases) by SADMIN02 after the 
Christmas/New Year break. The apparent flipping of bank details occurred for 
large numbers of vendors, but these details remained in force for several weeks. A 
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small number of immaterial financial transactions were entered for these vendors 
during this period by SADMIN04 and SADMIN06. There was no evidence of 
exploiting the changed bank details during this period to commit material fraud. 
Internal audit were charged with the task of investigating this unusual set of 
events. 
Flipping of bank details could be indicated by the apparent sharing of bank 
accounts. This occurs when an invoice is paid to the account of a vendor, which 
has the same bank details as another vendor in the system. Some evidence of bank 
account sharing by vendors was revealed, but these cases involved spouses or 
multiple vendor master records for the same vendor. These were examined and 
were considered genuine. 
SADMIN users were also engaged in the entry of financial transactions, including 
FB60. An examination was performed on the financial transactions entered by 
SADMIN01 and SADMIN02 for the vendors changed by these users. These 
postings were trivial in amount. Only five were payments. Financial transactions 
for these vendors entered by other SADMIN users appeared normal and did not 
involve the redirection of payments to other bank accounts. 
Despite the alert raised on discovery of the abnormal activity by SADMIN01 (and 
SADMIN02), there was no evidence found of material fraud by that user. It 
seemed that SADMIN users performed the functions of normal users – 
maintaining vendors, entering invoices and paying vendors. There were breaches 
in the normal segregation of duties principles: (1) separating the functions 
performed by accounting users from those of system administrators; and (2) 
separating vendor maintenance, entry of invoices/postings and payment functions. 
The financial transactions entered by SADMIN01 and SADMIN02 appeared 
trivial vendor changes. 
This investigation led to wide changes to user profiles in this company. 
Segregation amongst normal users seemed to be following appropriate 
segregation principles. However, vendor maintenance and invoice entry were not 
adequately segregated. Two accounts payable personnel were subsequently 
assigned new profiles for vendor maintenance and invoice entry respectively. It 
was determined that SADMIN users had been able to perform vendor 
maintenance, invoice entry and payment transactions because of their assigned 
user profiles. These were mainly SAP_ALL profiles which give the user 
unlimited access to system functions. It was necessary to design new profiles for 
SADMIN users that explicitly provided authorizations for their roles in system 
administration. This had the effect of removing their ability to perform the 
functions of accounting users. 
This investigation highlights the potential vulnerability to vendor fraud that may 
arise from inadequate segregation of duties and the need for automated 
continuous fraud detection solutions. 
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9. LIMITATIONS 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the fraud detection methodology 
presented in this paper. The audit trails that are maintained by enterprise systems 
are the basis for this methodology. As such, their integrity is paramount in 
assessing the usefulness of this methodology for detecting actual fraud. 
The behaviour of individual users will be recorded in detail in the audit trails. 
However, system administrators, often called ‘super-users’ given their unlimited 
privileges, may be able to selectively edit audit trail data, such as entries in the 
security audit log, to remove evidence of ‘red flags’ associated with their own 
activity. Similarly, intruders in the system who are masquerading as authentic 
users may target these super-users and exploit these capabilities to remove any 
trace of their activities in the system. 
Accordingly, it is acknowledged that the fraud detection methodology proposed in 
this paper may not be useful in detecting fraud by super-users, nor intruders who 
masquerade as these powerful users. However, this methodology is very useful in 
detecting fraudulent behaviour by normal users or intruders masquerading as such 
users, who lack these capabilities. Most reported cases of fraud seem to be 
perpetrated by such unsophisticated users. 
10. CONCLUSION 
This paper has addressed some of the challenges enterprise systems and 
continuous assurance pose to the accounting and auditing professions. One 
important challenge is how fraud detection can be integrated into continuous 
assurance services in the enterprise system. This paper has demonstrated one 
possible method for continuous fraud detection in enterprise systems based on 
extraction of data from audit trails. It proposes a methodology using audit trail 
analysis where user behaviour is monitored and analysed to detect specific fraud 
scenarios. Its application was demonstrated using the mySAP solution. The 
application of this methodology in investigating potential material fraud was also 
demonstrated using a case study of an Australian company. 
Looking at the enterprise systems market and current vendor strategies, 
developments could be expected to take one of two routes. One is that 
continuous assurance tools continue to be stand-alone applications that extract 
data from the enterprise system – i.e. the MCL approach. The other is that 
enterprise system vendors will incorporate these systems in their enterprise 
systems solutions and develop EAM for use by auditors.  
Accounting information systems have undergone considerable change over the 
past decade, and more extensive changes are likely to come in the future. 
Assurance services and associated technologies must keep pace with these 
changes. Accordingly, the development of continuous monitoring tools and 
fraud detection will be rich research areas. This includes further research into 
the applicability of EAM and MCL approaches respectively, the differences 
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and similarities between different enterprise system vendor approaches, the 
practices of auditing firms regarding continuous auditing and determinants of 
market demand for continuous assurance and continuous assurance tools.  
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